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7The First Amendment and the
Imminence of Harm
Floyd Abrams
†
First Amendment law came late to the United States.
The Constitution was ratified in 1788 and the Bill of Rights
adopted in 1789, but not until 130 years later, in 1919, did the
Supreme Court render a decision that began to flesh out just
what speech the First Amendment protected and what not.
1
There had been much public debate about the scope of the First
Amendment as early as 1798 when the Sedition Act of that year
was adopted—Thomas Jefferson staunchly opposed it, saying
that living under it was akin to being ruled by a “reign of
witches”
2
—but no Supreme Court decision passed upon it until
1964 when Justice William J. Brennan’s opinion in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan observed that the “court of history” had
determined that the law was unconstitutional.
3
There were a few
early First Amendment cases, most memorably the 1833 ruling
in Barron v. Baltimore holding that the Bill of Rights applied
only to the federal government, and the 1907 ruling in Patterson
v. Colorado upholding a contempt of court ruling against a
Denver newspaper that seemed to limit the scope of the First
Amendment to prior restraints on speech and did not seem to
offer much protection for even that speech.
4
Both of those cases
dismissed claims that First Amendment rights had been
overcome. Both limited the amount and nature of First
Amendment claims for years to come.
†
Floyd Abrams is Senior Counsel at Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP and a
Visiting Lecturer at Yale Law School. He received a B.A. from Cornell University in 1956
and a J.D. from Yale Law School in 1959.
1
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (June 4, 1798), https://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-30-02-0280 [https://perma.cc/QKN8-S3WY] (“[A]
little patience, and we shall see the reign of witches pass over, their spells dissolve, and the
people recovering their true sight, restor[ing] their government to it’s [sic] true principles.”).
3
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
4
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833) (“These amendments
contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This
court cannot so apply them.”); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1907).
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With the coming of World War I, however, different
questions arose about the scope of the First Amendment in the
context of cases arising from federal prosecutions against radical
speakers who opposed the war or other governmental policies,
who were indicted of extremely serious crimes based on what they
said, whowere convicted andwho appealed to the Supreme Court.
In three of them, the Court (in majority opinions or dissents)
discussed my topic for this essay: how immediate must a threat
to the nation be to allow punishment for the speech?
The first of these cases was Schenck v. United States.
5
Charles Schenck was a Socialist party official who printed and
distributed anti-war leaflets which argued that conscription was “a
monstrous wrong against humanity,” that it had been foisted on the
public by “cunning politicians and amercenary capitalist press,” and
the like.
6
He was convicted under the 1917 Espionage Act for
obstructing the recruiting and enlistment services of the United
States and conspiracy to cause “insubordination” within the armed
forces.
7
It was in Schenck that Justice Holmes drafted one of the two
best known sentences in American legal history—and certainly U.S.
First Amendment history. That was his observation that “[t]hemost
stringent protection of free speechwould not protect aman in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”
8
Two lines later, he articulated the other: “[t]he question
in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.”
9
“[C]lear and present danger”
10
—surely a phrase that has
not been forgotten. But just what did Holmes mean by a “present”
danger? How immediate? How present? The speech at issue in
Schenck was, of all things, a quotation from the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution that barred slavery and a brief
argument to the effect that the draft violated that legal precept.
That Holmes concluded that such language from a fringe group
with little power of any real sort was really a “present danger” to
the war effort may be difficult for us to fathom.
11
But his conclusion
that speech can only be punished when it poses a clear and present
5
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6
Id. at 49, 51.
7
Id. at 49.
8
Id. at 52.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 52–53.
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danger remains one of the most significant protections of First
Amendment rights ever articulated by a Supreme Court jurist.
Let’s skip ahead now to another post-World War I speech
prosecution, the case of Abrams—no relative of mine, incidentally—
v. United States.
12
It was also an Espionage Act prosecution,
although this one arose not out of anti-war language but rather the
distribution of leaflets by radical Russian émigrés who denounced
the United States for sending troops into Russia after the revolution
in that nation in 1917.
13
From its title, “WORKERS—WAKEUP” to
its impassioned conclusion, “Woe unto those who will be in the way
of progress. Let solidarity live!” the leaflet harshly denounced
American intervention in Russia in the aftermath of the Revolution
in that nation.
14
“Workers,” the leaflet cried, “our reply to the
barbaric intervention has to be a general strike!”
15
“We must not,” it
continued, “and will not betray the splendid fighters of Russia.
Workers, up to fight.”
16
As summarized in Professor Richard
Polenberg’s definitive study of the Abrams case:
Despite its strong and occasionally provocative language, the
leaflet is on the whole cautious and even circumspect . . . . There is a
strident denunciation of President Wilson’s insincerity, but no attack
on the form of government of the United States. Workers are exhorted
to “awake” and “rise,” but not to take concrete action of any kind.
17
Like the Schenck case, it is not easy for us today to
comprehend how the speech at issue led to any prosecution, but so it
did, andhere JusticeHolmes dissented in an opinionwhichmaywell
be the most sublime defense of the First Amendment ever written.
As regards the topic of this essay, this is what he had to say:
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country.
18
12
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919).
13
Id. at 620–22.
14
RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME
COURT, ANDFREESPEECH 51–52 (1987). The original leaflet was published in both Yiddish
and English versions; the Yiddish version—admittedly more militant in word choice and
tone—was translated into English after the arrests and formed the basis for the
indictments and the Supreme Court’s ruling. Id. at 51. A later translation of the leaflet
more accurately reflects the nuances of the Yiddish leaflet’s politics, namely, the conflict
between socialists and anarchists. Id. at 54–55.
15
Id. at 52.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 51.
18
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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And he continues: “Only the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants
making any exception to the sweeping command, ‘Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.’”
19
A third case in the post-World War I era bears on the topic
of the level of immediacy that is required before the government
may limit or punish speech is Whitney v. California, which
involved the conviction of Charlotte Anita Whitney for joining an
organization—the Communist Labor Party—for violating a
California statute which made it criminal to join any organization
organized “to advocate, teach, aid and abet criminal syndicalism,”
a term defined as including the “commission of crime,
sabotage . . . , or unlawful acts of force and violence.”
20
Justice
Brandeis, applying the still newly-minted clear and present
danger test in his dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice
Holmes, first observed that the Court had yet to articulate any
“standard by which to determine when a danger shall be deemed
clear[ ] [or] how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed
present.”
21
Brandeis then proceeded to write what may well be the
most beautiful passage in Supreme Court history. Here it is:
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to
be prevented is a serious one.
22
In these three cases, the two most celebrated jurists in our
history insisted that only the most imminent threats from speech
can be punished. There have been many cases addressing that
issue thereafter, including a particularly powerful concurring
opinion of Justice Brandeis inWhitney, in which the Court—or at
least some of its members—repeated in one linguistic formulation
or another the proposition that speech may only be punished
when it would imminently or immediately lead to or actually
cause some extremely serious danger.
23
But two cases in the second half of the twentieth century
illustrated the difficulty of applying that principle. The first of
19
Id. at 630–31 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
20
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 359–60 (1927), overruled in part by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
21
Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
22
Id. at 376.
23
Id.
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them, Dennis v. United States, arose out of the convictions of
Communist Party leaders under the federal Smith Act for
conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government.
24
There
was no evidence offered in the case that any harm from the
speech at issue would occur in the near future.
25
As the great
First Amendment scholar Harry Kalven, Jr. commented on the
Dennis case in A Worthy Tradition, his masterful study of the
First Amendment, “the revolution is set for the indefinite future.
The danger, however clear and weighty, is not present.”
26
Chief Justice Vinson’s answer, in his opinion for the
majority in Dennis that affirmed the conviction of the defendants,
all but abandoned the requirement that the danger be immediate.
27
Adopting a formulation offered by Judge Learned Hand in his
opinion for the Second Circuit affirming the conviction of the
Communist leaders, the best was this: “In each case [courts] must
ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger.”
28
There is no doubt that that test simply
jettisons the requirement of the earlier opinions (some of them
dissents, to be sure) that I referred to previously. It does so in a
fashion in which the first element will almost always be easy to
prove—in Schenck, for example, leaving the nation without a full
army prepared to fight World War I would certainly be a “grave”
result—so the critical issue remaining for judicial review would be
limited to the “probability” that the harm would actually occur.
But this requirement as well, as one more recent case
suggests, may be more illusory than not, as courts defer to the
executive branch based on the notion that it, rather than the
judiciary, has special expertise in matters of defense and
national security.
29
There is nothing foolhardy in the latter
proposition. The executive branch of government does have far
more experience in that area. But it is the judiciary that must
decide how to apply the First Amendment and if it simply defers
to the very branch of government that has gone to court in the
first place to prevent or punish publications that reveal “secrets”
24
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497–98 (1951).
25
Id. at 587 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“This record, however, contains no evidence
whatsoever showing that theacts charged . . . the teachingof theSoviet theoryof revolutionwith
the hope that it will be realized, have created any clear and present danger to the Nation.”).
26
HARRYKALVEN, JR., AWORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
197 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
27
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
28
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
29
SeeHolder v.HumanitarianLawProject, 561U.S. 1, 33 (2010) (“That evaluation
of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s assessment, is entitled to deference.”).
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there would be little likelihood that First Amendment
arguments would succeed except in the most extraordinary case.
Consider themost recent case in this area, one that always
seemed to me the most difficult of all. When The Progressive
magazine decided in 1979 to warn the public about the dangers
of nuclear war, it did so in an extraordinary way by publishing an
article called The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got it, Why We’re
Telling It.
30
The article contained a good deal of what the U.S.
government claimed was highly classified restricted data and
detail about the make-up of a hydrogen bomb, leading the United
States to seek an injunction in federal court against the
publication of information about what U.S. District JudgeWarren
described as “the most destructive weapon in the history of
mankind.”
31
The parties argued extensively about how much of
the article was actually new, the magazine arguing that the
“secret” it had trumpeted it was publishing was actually no secret
at all and that the technologically detailed parts of the article had
already been published before.
32
The United States, bolstered by
a detailed affidavit of Dr. Hans A. Bethe, one of the creators of the
atomic bomb, maintained that the article contained information
that had never before been made public.
33
Ultimately, the court ruled in a predictable manner. Given
the magnitude of the danger involved, the court granted the
government a prior restraint on publication of the article.
34
“[O]ne
cannot enjoy freedom of speech, freedom to worship or freedom of
the press,” the court observed, “unless one first enjoys the freedom
to live.”
35
A prior restraint against publication was entered, the
magazine appealed, and, while the appellate process weaved its
way through the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, an article was
prepared by a number of scientists who worked at the Argonne
National Laboratory based on unclassified data which contained
data similar to that in The Progressive’s article and which was
published in the student newspaper of the University of
California at Berkeley.
36
The letter was quickly classified by the
Department of Energy, and shortly afterwards the government
30
Howard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It – Why We’re Telling It,
PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 3.
31
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 991, 995 (W.D.Wis. 1979).
32
Id. at 993 (“Defendants contend that the projected article merely contains
data already in the public domain and readily available to any diligent seeker.”).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1000.
35
Id. at 995.
36
Bill Lueders, The H-Bomb Case Revisited, PROGRESSIVE (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://progressive.org/magazine/the-h-bomb-case-revisited-lueders-190801/
[https://perma.cc/8P5C-MM6J].
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moved to dismiss the case as moot.
37
The case was dismissed but
not before the district court had applied the Dennis test without
quite saying so.
38
There was no doubt that the gravity of the evil
of other nations learning how to build an H-Bomb was about as
high as is imaginable. As for the likelihood of the harm actually
occurring, the district court weighed the issue carefully and,
predictably enough, ruled for the government.
39
What has become of the fabled Holmes and Brandeis
opinions? The government in the Progressive case provided no
evidence at all of imminent harm. Indeed, the district court all but
acknowledged that in its conclusion that the problem posed by the
article was merely that it “could accelerate the membership of a
candidate nation in the thermonuclear club.”
40
Responding to the
argument that it was “only a question of time before other
countries will have the hydrogen bomb,” Judge Warren observed
that while the United States first successfully had exploded a
hydrogen bomb twenty-six years before, only five countries had
such a bomb by 1979.
41
“This time factor,” he observed “becomes
critical,” as it had been inWorldWar II when Hitler had failed “to
get his V-1 and V-2 bombs operational quickly enough to
materially affect the outcome of World War II.”
42
The Progressive case illustrates the difficulty of articulating
a legal standard in this area that provides enough protection for
freedom of speech at the same time it permits some limits on
speech in truly extraordinary and deeply threatening
circumstances.We look back on theHolmes andBrandeis decisions
of the past and wonder how anyone could have thought that the
speech involved in them, usually by the least persuasive and least
threatening speakers, was genuinely dangerous. We look back to
the inflamed time of the Dennis case andwonder how anyone could
have disagreed with Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent
expressing disbelief that the government could have brought what
was essentially a sedition case against people whom he dismissed
as “miserable merchants of unwanted ideas.”
43
What we see is that our government, often fully supported
by largemajorities of the public, not only has brought andwon such
cases in the past, but invariably cites what may appear to be grave
risks to national security when it does so. Consequently, we need
37
Id.
38
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 996.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 994.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 589 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the strongest First Amendment protections so that what amounts
to government persecution of political dissent must be successfully
resisted. But at the same time, we need some room—constrained,
cabined, and deliberately designed to be used in only themost truly
dangerous cases—for the government to go to court and seek relief.
No words can easily convey how to strike that balance or
to provide assurance that when the level of danger from speech
seems to be at its apex that First Amendment protections will—
or, in the most dire circumstances, should—carry the day. But
the rule and not the most unlikely exception must assure that
what is at its core the political persecution of political dissent
must be avoided.
